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US FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND MOTOR CARRIER PROFITABILITY
Ahren Johnston
North Carolina Agricultural & Technical State University
ABSTRACT
This study explores the impact of recent federal regulations, such as Comprehensive Safety Analysis (CSA)
2010, Hours of Service Changes, Environmental Regulations, and electronic logbooks on motor carrier
profitability. Quarterly data from 2004 – 2015 from U.S. publicly traded motor carriers is used to estimate
the temporal trends on various financial ratios after controlling for general economic and carrier specific
characteristics. Results of the analysis reveal that motor carrier profitability was declining between 2004
and 2009 but has been improving since that time.

INTRODUCTION
The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
(FMCSA) fully implemented its new
Comprehensive Safety Analysis (CSA) 2010 in the
fourth quarter of 2010, and many carriers and
industry experts were concerned that it would lead
to the exit of many drivers from the industry. Many
carriers voiced this concern in their 2010 Annual
Reports. J.B. Hunt Transport Service, Inc. said “. .
. CSA 2010 could have a material adverse effect on
the ability to obtain qualified drivers” (2011a).
Werner Enterprises said, “This may limit our ability
to attract and retain qualified drivers” (2011a).
Arkansas Best Corporation said, “CSA regulations
could potentially result in a loss of business to other
carriers, driver shortages, increased costs for
qualified drivers, and driver and/or business
suspension for noncompliance” (2011a) thus
indicating that they were concerned about a driver
shortage and a potential reduction in profitability.
Old Dominion Freight Lines held a similar view and
said that, “The implementation of FMCSA’s
Compliance, Safety, Accountability initiative
(“CSA”) could adversely impact our ability to hire
qualified drivers, meet our growth projections and
maintain our customer relationships, each of which
could adversely impact our results of operations”
(2011a).
In addition to CSA 2010, carriers expressed
concerns about new hours of service rules that had
been proposed, and about Electronic On-Board
Recorder (EOBR) requirements, which the

FMCSA was discussing. During the timeframe of
this study, new emissions standards for heavy
trucks, ultra-low sulfur diesel requirements, and fuel
efficiency standards were added to the Federal
Registry. These various changes likely impacted
costs and profitability in some way, but it is difficult
to separate the effects of any individual changes
from the effect of the other changes.
While the original motivation of this study was to
investigate the relationship between two specific
regulatory changes, the plethora of regulatory
changes that have taken place in the time frame of
this study make it difficult, if not impossible, to
determine the specific impact of CSA2010 and
hours of service changes. Therefore, the primary
motivations of this study are (1) to determine if
changes in motor carrier profitability after these
specific regulations were large enough to be
statistically significant despite the confounding
factors introduced into the regulatory environment
during the time-frame in question and (2) to see the
temporal changes that have occurred in motor
carrier profitability as these regulatory changes have
been announced and implemented.
SUMMARY OF REGULATORY CHANGES
CSA 2010
CSA 2010 (known as both “Comprehensive Safety
Analysis” and “Compliance, Safety, and
Accountability”) was intended to provide a means
to assess how well commercial motor vehicle
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carriers and drivers complied with safety rules and
to better intervene with those who are not
complying. CSA replaced the previous compliance
review program and SafeStat, an earlier program
designed to monitor and evaluate the safety of
motor carriers. CSA was tested in nine states
between 2008 and 2009 and was initiated nationally
in December 2010. The three components of CSA
are: measurement, evaluation, and intervention.
Measurement and evaluation come in the form of a
Safety Measurement System (SMS) which gives
carriers a score on seven criteria using an algorithm
that controls for the number and severity of
violations and size of the fleet. Of these seven
criteria, five are publicly available on the CSA
website. These scores are then used to identify
carriers for early intervention (Harrison et. al.,
2012). As the FMCSA refines their methodology
for calculating these SMS scores, historical SMS
scores are retroactively calculated after each
update. The five publicly available measures are:
unsafe driving, hours of service, vehicle
maintenance, controlled substance/alcohol, and
driver fitness. Two additional scores are calculated
and used by the FMCSA and made available to the
carriers. These are: crash indicator and hazardous
materials compliance.
Although many industry analysts, industry
organizations, and carriers predicted increases in
driver shortages following the implementation of
CSA 2010, these additional driver shortages did not
seem to happen based on number of employees
(Harrison et al., 2012). However, the lack of a
driver shortage does not mean that carrier costs
were not impacted by the rule. There may have
been additional costs associated with compliance
and inspections, but these may have been offset by
fewer accidents and incidents as carriers try to
proactively maintain low (better) scores.
Hours of Service
After remaining unchanged since 1962, hours or
service rules were changed in 2003, and these
changes went into effect in January 2004. These
rules increased the allowable drive time per cycle
and off duty time per cycle but decreased the
8

Journal of Transportation Management

maximum driving time per day. Possibly the biggest
change of this rule was the addition of the 34-hour
restart provision, which led to an increase in
maximum driving hours per week. This provision
allows for a driver who has reached his/her weekly
maximum driving time to “reset the clock” upon
completing 34 consecutive hours off duty.
Following lengthy legal battles questioning the
motivation and impact of these changes, new hours
of service regulations were announced in 2011 and
went into effect in July of 2013. This new rule
changed the maximum average hours per week a
driver could theoretically achieve by placing
restrictions on the 34-hour restart rule. It could only
be used once per seven day period and had to
include two time periods between 1:00 am and 5:00
am. This restriction increased the effective reset
period to 45 hours or more depending on the
driving habits of an individual driver. A second
change required a 30-minute break after 8 hours of
driving and could have potentially limited driving
hours by 30 minutes per day, or this break could
have been incorporated into the split sleeper berth
allowance (Johnston, 2013). In December 2014
Congress suspended the 34-hour restart restrictions
pending the submission of the CMV Driver Restart
Study to Congress (FMCSA, 2016). This report
was made available to Congress in March 2017,
and it was determined that the restrictions to the 34hour restart would remain suspended (FMCSA,
2017). This effectively made the new rules identical
to the 2004 rules in terms of maximum driving hours
per day and week with the additional restriction of a
30-minute break after 8 hours of driving.
A difficulty with determining the impact of this most
recent change is that many carriers may have
adhered to the 2011 rule even though a major
portion was not being enforced because it was
unclear when the CMV Driver Restart Study would
be made available to Congress and what the results
of the study would show. These changes could
have impacted the productivity of drivers and
increased costs and reduced profitability for
carriers; however, if the presumptive goal of the
rules to increase alertness of drivers was achieved,
costs could have been reduced through fewer
accidents and incidents. Contradictory to this

proposition, fatalities, injuries and property only
crashes have been on an upward trend since 2009
or 2010. This is evident in Figure 1which uses data
from Trends Tables 4, 7, and 10 in Large Truck
and Bus Crash Facts 2015 available from the
FMCSA (2017b).
Electronic Logging Devices (ELD)
Another area of concern for carriers in their 2010
Annual Reports was the possible requirement on
ELDs. In April 2010, a final rule with a June 2012
compliance date set standards and incentives for the
use of Electronic On-Board Recorders (EOBRs)
and requirements for the use by carriers with serious
hours of service non-compliance. However, the
final rule applicable to all carriers was published in
the Federal Register on December 16, 2015 and
required ELDs of all carriers (with a few
exceptions) by December 18, 2017. Many carriers
had voluntarily installed EOBR and other Automatic
Onboard Recording Devices (AOBR) in advance of
the rule and will have until December 16, 2019 to
replace these with ELDs. Further exceptions
include drivers of driveaway-towaway operations
delivering the vehicle they are driving, drivers of
pre-2000 model year vehicles, and drivers required
to keep a Record of Duty Status (RODS) or
logbook not more than 8 out of 30 days (FMCSA,
2016a). Although this rule was not in effect during

the period of this study, many motor vehicle
operations began investing in AOBRs as early as
2009 when the rule was on the horizon (Heartland
Express Inc,. 2011; Knight Transportation, 2011;
Werner Enterprises, 2011). In a conversation with
an executive of a large refrigerated carrier in 2010,
it was explained that with EOBRs the carrier was
less likely to be audited, and if an audit did occur, it
would be less costly to provide the required data.
Further complicating the impact of this rule on
carriers is that carriers have had between two and
four years to invest in ELD’s, and it is difficult to
determine when they will actually make the
investment.
Emissions
Much more restrictive emissions standards were
phased in from 2007-2010 (EPA, 2016c). These
standards reduced the amount of Non-Methane
Hydrocarbons and Nitrous Oxides by 90%. These
standards were required for 50% of engines for
model years 2007-2009 and 100% of engines for
2010 model year trucks. There were significant
increases in the price of new and used trucks in
2010 as these changes went into effect. An estimate
of average tractor price was included in the model
to account for this increase, but that does not
necessarily coincide with when a carrier buys a new
truck or if they buy a used truck.
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Ultra-Low Sulfur Diesel
In conjunction with the new emissions standards, the
requirement for Ultra Low Sulfur Diesel was phased
in between 2006-2010 (EPA, 2016b) with the
allowable limit going from 500ppm down to 15ppm.
This change could have impacted the price of diesel
fuel, but it is difficult to say if changes are the result
of the new regulation or due to other market
conditions.
Fuel Efficiency
Finally, standards related to fuel economy for
combination vehicles required a 20% increase in fuel
economy between model years 2014-2018, and a
further increase of 2.5% per year between model
years 2021-2027 (EPA, 2016a). These standards
likely increased the price of new tractors but also
reduced the cost of operations with better fuel
economy.
SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS AND DATA
SOURCES
The primary data source for this study is the (10-k)
and quarterly (8-k) reports of the publicly traded
motor carriers in the United States (ArcBest
Corporation, 2004a-2015a, ArcBest Corporation,
2004b-2015b, Celadon Group Inc., 2004a-2015a,
Celadon Group Inc., 2004b-2015b, Con-Way Inc.,
2004a-2015a, Con-Way Inc., 2004b-2015b,
Covenant Transportation Group Inc., 2004a2015a, Covenant Transportation Group Inc.,
2004b-2015b, Heartland Express Inc., 2004a2015a, Heartland Express Inc., 2004b-2015b,
J.B. Hunt Transport Services Inc., 2004a-2015a,
J.B. Hunt Transport Services Inc., 2004b-2015b,
Knight Transportation Inc., 2004a-2015a, Knight
Transportation Inc., 2004b-2015b, Marten
Transport Ltd., 2004a-2015a, Marten Transport
Ltd., 2004b-2015b, Old Dominion Freight Line
Inc., 2004a-2015a, Old Dominion Freight Line
Inc., 2004b-2015b, P.A.M. Transportation
Services Inc., 2004a-2015a, P.A.M. Transportation
Services Inc., 2004b-2015b, USA Truck Inc.,
2004a-2015a, USA Truck Inc., 2004b-2015b,
Werner Enterprises Inc., 2004a-2015a, Werner
Enterprises Inc., 2004b-2015b, YRC Worldwide
Inc., 2004a-2015a, YRC Worldwide Inc., 2004b10
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2015b). The sample included all the publicly traded
motor carriers that were in business from the first
quarter of 2004 through the second quarter of
2015. The second quarter of 2015 was selected as
the final date because initial tests on the data
revealed that a balanced panel of data would be
optimal for the estimation. XPO Logistics
purchased Con-Way and stopped filing reports with
the SEC after June 2015, so using the second
quarter of 2015 as the final date rather than the
second quarter of 2016 allowed for the inclusion of
Con-Way. The inclusion of Con-Way allowed for
598 total quarterly observations on 13 carriers over
46 quarters, and the exclusion of Con-Way would
have allowed for a total of 600 total quarterly
observations on 12 carriers over 50 quarters. This
decision was made in order to maximize the
sampled carriers but likely had little impact on the
results. The only excluded publicly traded carrier,
Frozen Foods Express, was purchased by a
privately held company in June 2013 and was
excluded from the sample. Frozen Foods Express
was also the only refrigerated carrier in the potential
sample and likely had significantly different operating
characteristics than the other, primarily dry van
carriers. Total annual revenue of PACCAR divided
by number of units sold was obtained from the
annual reports of PACCAR (2004a-2015a, 2004b2015b), a company controlling between 21% and
29% of the heavy truck market between 2004 and
2015, and used as an estimate of new tractor price.
Information on the implicit price deflator and the
growth of the services sector of gross domestic
product came from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (2016a). Information on the national
average diesel price came from the US Energy
Information Administration (2016). Finally,
information on when the US economy was in a
recession was obtained from the National Bureau of
Economic Research (2016a).
The companies included in the sample of quarterly
observations are listed in Table 1, and descriptive
statistics of the variables included in estimation are
shown in Table 2.

As can be seen in Table 2, there is a significant
variation in all the variables to be included in the
model, and the time span of the study included
difficult times for motor carriers. It further reveals
that 31% of the sample were LTL carriers and 69%
were predominately truckload carriers; 15% of the
sample were unionized carries; 15% of the
observations were from a recession although the
services sector only contracted in 8.7% of those
quarters; 41% of the observations came after the
implementation of CSA2010; and only 13% and
4% of the observations came from times when the
hours of service regulations were changed. The
2013 change added the requirement of a break for
every 8 hours of driving, which could be
incorporated into the split sleeper berth allowance
for some carriers, a different definition of on-duty
time, and restrictions to the 34-hour restart
provision.
HYPOTHESES Due to the large number of
regulatory and economic changes that occurred
during the time of the study that are difficult or
impossible to isolate, the following hypotheses are
based on the working assumption that carriers’
performance has suffered over time. This has been
the generally accepted view in the trade press and
amongst industry leaders. These hypotheses do not
try to assign specific causes but state that the
combined effect of all regulatory changes has been a
decrease in financial performance.

Hypothesis 1: The Operating Ratio of
motor carriers has increased (worsened)
over time.
Hypothesis 2: Return on Assets of
motor carriers has decreased over time.
Hypothesis 3: Return on Equity of
motor carriers has decreased over time.
Hypothesis 4: Net Profit of motor
carriers has decreased over time.
Hypothesis 5: Sales per Employee of
motor carriers have decreased over time.
The secondary hypotheses of this study are that
after the implementation of CSA 2010 and HOS
guidelines and rules, specifically, changed the
financial performance of motor carriers in a negative
way. The specific hypotheses are that:
Hypothesis 1a: Operating Ratio of
motor carriers increased (worsened)
after CSA 2010.
Hypothesis 1b: Operating Ratio of
motor carriers increased (worsened)
after HOS changes.
Hypothesis 2a Return on Assets for
motor carriers declined after CSA 2010.
Hypothesis 2b: Return on Assets for
motor carriers declined after HOS
changes.
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Hypothesis 3a: Return on Equity for
motor carriers declined after CSA 2010.
Hypothesis 3b: Return on Equity for
motor carriers declined after HOS
changes.
Hypothesis 4a: Net Profit for motor
carriers declined after CSA 2010.
Hypothesis 4b: Net Profit for motor
carriers declined after HOS changes.
Hypothesis 5a: Sales per Employee for
motor carriers declined after CSA 2010.
Hypothesis 5b: Sales per Employee for
motor carriers declined after HOS
changes.

12
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STATISTICAL MODEL
Equations
To test hypotheses 1-5 and to account for the
impact of multiple regulatory changes, equations 1-5
were estimated using linear regression with variables
for year and year2 included to test for temporal
trends. This allowed for observation of the trends in
costs from year to year after accounting for
recessions, the growth of the economy and various
other factors. Initial testing of the data revealed that
curvilinear trends would provide the best fit. Initial
testing revealed that costs and financial results were
significantly different in quarter 2 than for all other
quarters due to the seasonality of the motor carrier
industry, so a dummy variable for Q2 was included
in the final models.

Where:
OR = operating ratio = Operating Expenses/
Operating Revenue
ROA = return on assets = Net Income/Total Assets
ROE = return on equity = Net Income/Total
Stockholder Equity
NI = net income=Net Income/Operating Revenue
SPE = sales per employee = Operating Revenue/
Number of Employees
LTL = 1 for less than truckload carriers, 0 otherwise
UC = 1 for union carriers, 0 otherwise
REC = 1 for a recession, 0 otherwise

DP = national average diesel price, adjusted for
inflation
TP = national average tractor price, adjusted for
inflation
GDP = gross domestic product growth
Q2 = 1 for the second quarter, 0 otherwise
YEAR = the year of the observation (1-14).
For an even clearer picture of what has happened
with the financial performance of these carriers for
the last 14 years, equations 6-10 were estimated using
a dummy variable for each year of observation.
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Where Yi=1 if observation is from year i, 0
otherwise

Equations 11-15 were then developed to test
hypotheses 1-5 and 1a-5a. Dummy variables were
used to capture the implementation of CSA 2010
and the two successive changes to HOS regulations.

Where:
CSA = 1 after the implementation of CSA 2010 in
the fourth quarter of 2010, 0 before
H2 = 1 for Q3 2013 – Q4 2014 (34-hour restart
restrictions were in effect), 0 otherwise
H3 = 1 for Q1 - Q2 2015 (34-hour restart
restrictions were abandoned), 0 otherwise

2010 and the two changes to hours of service
requirements. This methodology requires the
assumption that the implementation dates were
when carriers saw an impact from these regulatory
changes. The problem with this assumption is that
carriers knew in advance of the implementation that
CSA 2010 would “go live” in the fourth quarter of
2010, so it is possible they changed their operating
procedures in advance of this date in order to
improve their scores on the seven criteria.
Furthermore, carriers likely changed their operating
procedures for the hours of service regulations that
went into effect in 2013 but may have changed them
any time in the two years between the
announcement and the implementation date. In
regards to the decision by FMCSA not to enforce
the 34-hour restart restrictions, it is likely that many
carriers were waiting to see the outcome of the
study being prepared for Congress and made no
changes to their operating procedures i.e. continued
to use the restrictions on the 34-hour restart. This

Estimation and Results
The models listed above were tested using the
POOL command in SHAZAM econometric
software. This technique allows for random effects
from the specific carriers. Initial tests in SHAZAM
indicated that the model should allow for crosssection heteroscedasticity, cross section correlation,
and correct for auto correlation. The inclusion of
these assumptions requires a balanced panel of
data, so the time of analysis went through third
quarter 2015 and Frozen Foods Express was
excluded from the sample. Equations 11-15 include
dummy variables for the implementation of CSA
14
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would have been simpler than changing operating
procedures twice in rapid succession when it was
unclear if or when the 34-hour restart restrictions
would be enforced.
In an effort to avoid the restrictive assumption of a
strict cut-off date, account for the many other
regulatory changes discussed in the summary of
regulatory changes, and test hypotheses 1b-5b;
equations 1-5 were used to estimate a curvilinear
trend over time for each of the dependent variables.
To provide a more complete picture of the changes
to the dependent variables over time, equations 610 were estimated and included dummy variables
for each year other than 2004. The coefficients
associated with these dummy variables will show the
changes to the various dependent variables (OR,
ROA, etc.) after controlling for the economy, the
type of carrier and the price of fuel and equipment.
Results of the estimation are shown in Tables 3-8
and results of Equations 1-10 are shown graphically
in Figures 2-6. Common to all estimation results are
the impacts of the control variables on the financial
performance of carriers. The following was found:








LTL carriers had better financial
performance than TL carriers with a lower
(better) operating ratio, higher return on
assets, higher return on equity, higher net
income and higher sales per employee.
Unionized carriers had worse financial
performance than non-unionized carriers
with a higher operating ratio, lower return
on assets, lower (but non-significant1) return
on equity, lower net income, and lower sales
per employee.
As one would expect, recessions hurt the
financial performance of carriers resulting in
higher operating ratios, lower returns on
assets, lower returns on equity, lower net
incomes, and lower sales per employee.
Surprisingly, diesel price seems to have little
or no impact on financial performance, but





this may be the result of the fuel surcharge,
that almost all carriers use to recover
additional costs associated with fluctuating
fuel costs, offsetting any additional costs.
Higher diesel prices were associated with
higher returns on equity and higher sales per
employee.
As expected, increases in tractor prices
were associated with worse financial
performance: higher operating ratio, lower
return on assets and equity, lower net
income and lower sales per employee.
Increases in gross domestic product growth
(GDP) also helped the financial
performance of carriers, and their
performance was better during the second
quarter of each year as compared to the
first, third and fourth. Both of these factors
were associated with lower operating ratio,
higher returns on assets and equity, higher
net income levels, and higher sales per
employee.

Surprisingly, Table 3 reveals that none of the specific
regulatory changes tested had a statistically
significant impact on Operating Ratio (OR)
(Equation 11), so Hypotheses 1a and 1b (Operating
Ratio worsened) are rejected. Based on the
coefficients of YEAR and YEAR2 in Equation 1 the
second derivative of this function with respect to
YEAR is negative, so this is a concave function with
a maximum value at YEAR = 7.59 (between 2010
and 2011). This maximum is based on finding the
inflection point of the function where the first
derivative with respect to YEAR equals zero. This
leads to the rejection of Hypothesis 1 because OR
was increasing but has been decreasing since the
implementation of CSA 2010 and has continued to
decrease with the changes to hours of service
regulations. Equation 6 reveals that between 2006
and 2015 OR was higher than in 2004, but it has
been declining since a peak in 2011. Figure 2
shows the percentage increase in OR over a 2004
base after accounting for the control variables. The
OR trend line was about 11% higher in 2010 and
2011, but that has declined to about 6% higher in
Vol. 30 No. 1
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2015 than in 2004. Because OR represents costs
as a percent of revenue, these higher values
represent worse financial performance on this
measure. However, as carriers adjust to regulatory
changes their performance seems to be returning to
earlier levels.
Table 4 reveals that Return on Assets (ROA) has
been worse for carriers since the implementation of
CSA 2010 (Equation 12), so Hypothesis 2a (CSA
2010 worsened ROA) is not rejected, but
Hypothesis 2b (HOS changes worsened ROA) is
rejected, indicating that the HOS regulatory changes
did not impact ROA. Based on the coefficients of
YEAR and YEAR2 in Equation 2, the second
derivative of this function with respect to YEAR is

16
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positive, so this is a convex function with a minimum
value at YEAR = 8 (2011). This minimum is based
on finding the inflection point of the function where
the first derivative with respect to YEAR equals
zero. This leads to the rejection of Hypothesis 2
because ROA was decreasing but has been
increasing since the implementation of CSA 2010
and has continued to increase with the changes to
hours of service regulations. Equation 7 reveals that
between 2007 and 2014 ROA was lower than in
2004, but it has been increasing since its lowest
point in 2011. Figure 3 shows the percentage
decrease in ROA over a 2004 base after accounting
for the control variables. The ROA trend line was
about 45% lower in 2011 but has increased to
about 24% lower in 2015 than in 2004; however,

this difference is not statistically significant. Carriers
have had worse performance on this measure since
2006, but as they adjust to regulatory changes their
performance seems to be returning to earlier levels.
Table 5 reveals that Return on Equity (ROE) was
not impacted by the implementation of CSA 2010
or the HOS regulatory changes (Equation 13), so
Hypotheses 3a and 3b (ROE worsened are
rejected. Based on the coefficients of YEAR and
YEAR2 in Equation 3, the second derivative of this
function with respect to YEAR is positive, so this is
a convex function with a minimum value at YEAR =
6.9 (between 2009 and 2010). This minimum is
based on finding the inflection point of the function
where the first derivative with respect to YEAR
equals zero. This leads to the rejection of
Hypothesis 3 because ROE was decreasing but has
been increasing since the implementation of CSA
2010 and has continued to increase with the
changes to hours of service regulations. Equation 8
reveals that between 2008 and 2009 ROE was
lower than in 2004, but it has been increasing since
its lowest point in 2010. Figure 4 shows the
percentage decrease in ROE over a 2004 base after
accounting for the control variables. The ROE
trend line was 64 and 65% lower in 2009 and
2011, but has increased to 17% lower in 2015 than

in 2004; however, this difference is not statistically
significant. Carriers have had worse performance
on this measure since 2004, but as they adjust to
regulatory changes their performance seems to be
returning to earlier levels. One additional thing to
note in regards to ROE is that YRC Worldwide, the
worst performing carrier of the sample, was omitted
from these estimations related to ROE due to a
negative stockholder equity for over half of the
sample period. The exclusion of this carrier could
have potentially, but not necessarily, skewed the
results with the random effects model.
Table 6 reveals that Net Income (NI) has been
worse for carriers since the implementation of CSA
2010 (Equation 14), so Hypothesis 4a (CSA 2010
worsened NI) is not rejected, but Hypothesis 4b
(HOS changes worsened NI) is rejected, indicating
that the HOS regulatory changes did not impact Net
Income. Based on the coefficients of YEAR and
YEAR2 in Equation 4, the second derivative of this
function with respect to YEAR is positive, so this is
a convex function with a minimum value at YEAR =
7.19 (between 2010 and 2011). This minimum is
based on finding the inflection point of the function
where the first derivative with respect to YEAR
equals zero. This leads to the rejection of
Hypothesis 4 because Net Income was decreasing
Vol. 30 No. 1
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but has been increasing since the implementation of
CSA 2010 and has continued to increase with the
changes to hours of service regulations. Equation 9
reveals that between 2007 and 2013 Net Income
was significantly lower than in 2004, but it has been
increasing since its lowest point in 2010 and 2011.
Figure 5 shows the percentage decrease in ROA
over a 2004 base after accounting for the control
variables. The Net Income trend line was 41%
lower in 2010 and 2011, but has increased to 20%
lower in 2015 than in 2004; however, this difference
is not statistically significant. Carriers have had
worse performance on this measure since 2007, but
as they adjust to regulatory changes their
performance seems to be returning to earlier levels.
Table 7 reveals that Sales per Employee (SPE) was
not impacted by the implementation of CSA 2010
or the HOS regulatory changes (Equation 15), so
Hypotheses 5a and 5b (Sales per Emplyee
worsened) are rejected. Based on the coefficients
of YEAR and YEAR2 in Equation 5, the second
derivative of this function with respect to YEAR is
positive, so this is a convex function with a minimum
value at YEAR = 7.79 (between 2010 and 2011).
This minimum is based on finding the inflection point
of the function where the first derivative with respect
to YEAR equals zero; however, the coefficients
associated with YEAE and YEAR2 were statistically
non-significant. This leads to the rejection of
Hypothesis 5. Equation 10 reveals that SPE was
significantly lower than in 2004 only in the year
2006, and it has been generally increasing since its
lowest point. Figure 6 shows the percentage
decrease in SPE over a 2004 base after accounting
for the control variables. SPE was about 5% lower
in 2011 and has increased to about 3% lower in
2015 than in 2004; however, this difference is not
statistically significant. Carriers have had fairly
consistent performance on this measure with a
statistically significant decrease only in 2006.
CONCLUSION
The results of this study suggest that, despite the
concerns carriers’ expressed in their annual reports,
CSA 2010, hours of service changes, and electronic
20
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logging devices have all been threats that the large
publicly traded motor carriers have been able to
deal with effectively while going through a massive
recession. This is a very important finding and
counter to what most observers inside and outside
of the motor carriers thought would be the case. In
essence, it seems that these carriers saw some
beneficial impacts from the regulations, and/or were
able to drive other efficiency gains despite these
regulations.
However, large publicly and privately held motor
carriers represent a small portion of motor carriers
and a relatively small portion of motor carrier
revenues. An interesting direction for future research
would be to see how these changes impacted
smaller carriers. This study also excluded bankrupt
carriers because none of the publicly traded motor
carriers underwent bankruptcy during the time frame
of this study; however, many small and medium
sized carriers went bankrupt during the “great
recession” (and YRCW would have gone bankrupt
were it a smaller carrier). This would be another
interesting factor to incorporate into future studies if
one were able to attain the appropriate data.
The overall result of all the estimations is that the
financial performance of carriers, as measured by
operating ratio, return on assets, return on equity,
and net income, declined after the implementation of
the HOS changes that went into effect in 2004 but
has been improving since the recession and the
implementation of the 2011 changes to HOS
regulations. This is most clearly illustrated by the
results of Equations 1-10 which show a statistically
significant curvilinear trend and annual differences
over 2004 values. These results are shown
graphically in Figures 2-5. These results indicate
that despite all the regulatory changes that have
gone into effect or will be going into effect between
2004 and 2023 and the difficulty motor carriers
have had trying to increase prices (Wilson, 2014),
they have been able to adjust to the changes and
improve their financial performance. An alternative
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explanation is that one of the regulatory changes
since 2009 has somehow led to an improvement in
the financial performance of motor carriers. It is
certainly conceivable that electronic logbooks or
more fuel-efficient tractors could lead to better
efficiency. Emissions regulations likely increased
costs with no benefit to profitability, but hours of
service changes could have potentially led to more
productive drivers who were better rested. These
possibilities are beyond the scope of this study but
could provide direction for future research.
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